

**CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF THE TRACK II NETWORK  
OF ASEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI)  
WORKSHOP ON MARITIME SECURITY  
AND THE LAUNCH OF THE NADI WEBSITE IN SINGAPORE  
ON 27 – 29 JULY 2009**

**Launch of the NADI Website**

1. The NADI website was launched at the beginning of the Workshop on Maritime Security held at the Marina Mandarin Singapore on 28 July 2009. Mr Eddie Teo, Chairman, Board of Governors, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, was the Guest-of-Honour to officiate the launch of the NADI website ([www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi))

2. In his speech, Mr Teo said that research institutions continued to play an important supportive role in contributing to the making of government policies. Since the 1970's, when the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was established in Indonesia, other ASEAN countries have developed their own policy research institutions. In Singapore the Institute of Policy Studies, the East Asian Institute and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (now a component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies) were institutions that provided policy makers with policy relevant knowledge. In the past research institutions worked separately from each other with no institutional links at the regional level. In the mid 1980s, the leading ASEAN institutions gathered in Bali to establish a regional network known as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies or ASEAN-ISIS. As a network ASEAN-ISIS has reviewed regional trends and developments that have an impact on the defence and security of the region. ASEAN-ISIS has sent its assessments and recommendations to the ASEAN Foreign Ministry senior officials for their consideration. The relationship between ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN Foreign Ministry officials have grown over the years. ASEAN-ISIS was asked to submit its views on the ASEAN Charter before it was adopted.

3. In the 1990's the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific or CSCAP with a membership of policy institutes in 28 countries with ASEAN-ISIS as a core group co-chairing the network. CSCAP has made itself relevant to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and has established an institutional link with the ARF Inter-Sessional Group (ARF-ISG). Similar regional networks of policy institutions were established in the economic field like the link between APEC and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the link between the Network of East Asia Think-Tanks (NEAT) and the ASEAN+3 Group

4. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) first met in Kulala Lumpur in 2006. The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) established and hosted the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) in August 2007 to support the ADMM. Thailand hosted the second NADI meeting in Bangsaen in early November 2008. The Chairman's reports of the inaugural and second NADI meetings were submitted to the ADMM which found the reports useful.

5. Mr Teo suggested that the NADI Workshop on Maritime Security could consider the new security trends emerging in the region like the increasing presence of naval powers in the region by regional and external navies. The re-assertion of territorial claims by some regional countries could well give rise to conflict and cause problems to safety of navigation

through the South China Sea and the region. The NADI Workshop could discuss these issues and suggest ideas to ensure that there would be no disruption to the safety of sea lines of communication and navigation through the region and that the conflicting territorial claims would not lead to confrontation. Ideas and proposals to foster closer military cooperation among NADI members will be beneficial to them. This would help to deal more effectively with the overall maritime security as well as the non-traditional security issues like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Such useful and fresh ideas would be of great relevance to the ADMM Track.

6. Mr Teo then launched the NADI website which was the initiative of RSIS, to highlight the work of NADI. The NADI participants welcomed the launch of the NADI website.

### **Workshop on Maritime Security**

7. The Workshop on Maritime Security which was organized by S Rajaratnam School of International Studies was held in Marina Mandarin Singapore from 27 – 29 July 2009. This Workshop was being held as a follow-up to the decision of the second NADI meeting. Representatives from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore attended the Workshop. The other NADI members were unable to attend. The list of participants attending the Workshop is attached at Annex A. Mr Tan Seng Chye, Senior Fellow, RSIS, chaired the Workshop.

#### Adoption of Agenda

8. The meeting adopted the agenda for the Workshop as outlined in the programme which is appended at Annex B.

#### Chairman's welcome remarks

9. Mr Tan Seng Chye welcomed and thanked the NADI members who attended the NADI Workshop. He said that though a few NADI members were unable to attend, they were being kept informed of this meeting's agenda and programme as well as the launch of the NADI website. He requested NADI members' core institutions to provide their websites and some important policy papers or statements which could be highlighted in the NADI website through links to their respective websites.

10. Mr Tan urged the participants to give their views on maritime security challenges from their own countries' perspective. They could also exchange views on the emerging new security trends in the region arising from the increasing naval presence of regional and external navies, the re-assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea, and the recent confrontation between a US naval survey ship and the Chinese Navy which almost became a crisis. These developments have implications for regional security and safety of navigation if they were not well managed. However this workshop would not be the appropriate forum to discuss the technical and legal aspects of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Mr Tan urged the participants to consider these emerging developments and provide ideas and recommendations to the ADMM track to maintain peace and security in the region.

11. He informed the meeting that the Singapore side would provide two briefings namely on Good Order at Sea and on the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF)'s role in ensuring maritime security. The MSTF's briefing was to highlight the coordinated efforts among

government agencies to counter maritime security threats. Malaysia's National Defence University would give a briefing on "regional maritime disputes: reducing tensions in the affected areas. The Vietnamese participant would give a briefing on "Maritime security challenges in the South China Sea and Vietnam's proposals for cooperation." ReCAAP ISC would brief on their role in information sharing and cooperation among regional countries in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The visit to Changi Naval Base and the briefing on Changi C2 and the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) were intended to inform the NADI participants of the coordination of information among regional countries as well as with external partners, to more effectively deal with piracy and other trans-boundary issues affecting maritime security.

12. Mr Tan hoped that all participants would give their views on maritime security challenges and actively discussed possible areas of cooperation among the ASEAN militaries in maritime security and their roles in enhancing maritime security cooperation.

### **Session One: Briefing on Maritime Security Challenges**

#### Briefing on Good Order at Sea

13. Miss Jane Chan, Associate Research Fellow, of the RSIS' Maritime Security Programme gave a presentation on "Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia". Good order at Sea referred to ensuring the safety and security of shipping and permitting countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their marine resources in an ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law. The lack of good order at sea was due to proliferation of illegal activities, inadequate resources to combat illegal activities, ineffective national legislation, poor coordination between national agencies and shortage of trained personnel and lack of maritime boundary. Threats to Good Order at Sea included maritime terrorism such as attacks at sea and mode of transport, trafficking at sea like preferred medium of movement of goods and people, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing due to lack of boundaries agreements, maritime pollution resulting from accidental or consequence of normal ship operation and maritime accidents with a lack of contingency plans.

14. The recommendations highlighted in the presentation included enhanced regional cooperation through institutionalizing the process of regional cooperation for good order at sea, including the development where appropriate, of institutional arrangement and capacity-building. The ASEAN Maritime Forum process should be re-invigorated and the ARF ISM on Maritime Security could be supported as frameworks for developing a regionally institutionalized approach to good order at sea. Regional countries bordering a semi-enclosed sea should fulfil their obligations under UNCLOS Article IX, noting that CSCAP's Memorandum No.13 had provided a useful guide to the fulfilment of these obligations. A formal trilateral mechanism should be introduced to provide for safety, security and environmental protection in the Sulu and Celebes Seas.

15. Secondly, improved risks assessment and reduction was recommended. A more effective and cooperative approach was required for the analysis of threats and contingency planning for major maritime security incidents that might occur in the region. Effective bilateral (or trilateral) agreements should be developed to manage an incident in areas where conflicting claims to sovereignty or maritime boundaries had not been agreed. Cooperative measures should be considered to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in

the region, including the prevention of trafficking at sea in such weapons. Regional cooperation for maritime search and rescue (SAR) should be strengthened.

16. Thirdly, wider information sharing was recommended. A higher level of good order at sea in Southeast Asia would require regional countries to take steps to enhance the sharing of information between them relevant to the detection, prevention and suppression of threats to good order at sea. International “best practice” had been developed in this regard but currently they were generally not being followed in the region. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) should be implemented on vessels below 300 gross tons and on vessels that were on local voyage. Regional countries should share AIS data via the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS). Hopefully, Indonesia and Malaysia would seriously consider joining ReCAAP.

#### Presentation by Malaysia on Regional Maritime Disputes--Reducing Tension in the Affected Areas

17. Lt Col Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan, Director, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia, gave a presentation on the Regional Maritime Disputes – Reducing Tension in the Affected Areas. The presentation sought to highlight the need to establish a comprehensive guideline in the form of a code of conduct to prevent untoward incidents at sea among the various security and law enforcement authorities of the member countries. Regional maritime disputes among ASEAN countries could potentially mar the harmonious relations among the ASEAN nations, affect the image of ASEAN as a successful regional organisation and violate the principles of ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1975.

18. Four major sources of maritime disputes among the ASEAN nations were disputes over maritime boundary delineation, overlapping claims over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), disputes over ownership of islands / low tide elevations and claims over continental shelf.

19. Provisions of UNCLOS III of 1982 allowed for nations to stake claims of territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from their respective baselines, a contiguous zone of similar breadth, an EEZ of 200 nautical miles and/or a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles.

20. Possibility of clashes occurring between the security / law enforcement agencies of the contending nations in the disputed maritime areas could be due to the following:

- overzealousness on the part of security / law enforcement personnel operating in or near the area
- lack of awareness of the ASEAN’s principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1975 and the relevant provisions of UNCLOS III among the personnel at lower level
- lack of guidelines especially at operational level as regards measures avoiding incidences at sea, could not be ruled out.

The introduction of a code of conduct that addressed the issue of preventing these clashes from occurring may be necessary.

21. As useful references, it was suggested that earlier treaty documents such as the relevant provisions of UNCLOS III, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1975,

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea 2002, MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incidents Cooperative Guidelines 2001, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG 1972), and Agreement between the UK and the USSR Concerning the Prevention of Incidents at Sea beyond the Territorial Sea 1986, be referred to as possible guidelines.

#### Briefing on Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF)'s Role in ensuring Maritime Security

22. LTC Chow Ngee Ken, Comprehensive Maritime Awareness Group Commander, Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF), Ministry of Defence, gave a presentation on "Maritime Security Task Force's role in ensuring maritime security". The task of ensuring maritime security required constant sensitivity to changes in the threat environment and doing the right thing at the right place and time. The two common threads of terrorist threats were obviously the constancy in their seeking out new and unorthodox ways to exploit inter-agency gaps and side-step enforcement agencies, and their determination to create a catastrophe and to inflict harm, at any cost.

23. RSN's aim was to reach into the "unknown-unknown" realm of the maritime domain faster and disrupt the terrorist's plans and intentions before their conceptions became concretised and to stay a step ahead, of what "shock attacks" that may come, after Mumbai. A three key prongs over-arching concept of operations for maritime security was articulated. First, to establish Comprehensive Maritime Awareness through research, real time threat evaluation as well as active surveillance, with the aim of cuing timely and resource-smart operational responses. Second, to counter threats effectively through a range of calibrated and flexible operations at sea and ashore by conducting preventive operations on identified threats. Third, to co-ordinate tightly with other Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) units and national maritime agencies and international partners and the maritime community to share information and stage co-ordinated operations.

24. The SAF had recently inaugurated the Maritime Security Task Force. The MSTF supported by the Changi Command and Control Centre, which comprised the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), the Multi-national Operations and Exercises Centre (MOEC), as well as the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), would take the lead to achieve the full effects of this new concept of operations.

25. MSTF was established as a SAF-level integrated task force and was responsible for maintaining maritime awareness, and for employing cross-domain capabilities from across the SAF and other national maritime agencies to execute maritime security operations. The heart of MSTF comprised of 3 key groups; the Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) Group, the Operations Group, and the Inter-agency Co-ordination Group. The mission of the CMA Group was to achieve a comprehensive maritime awareness for Singapore through delivering a National Common Operating Picture. At the international level, the CMA Group would be linked to the IFC through which it would be connected to Singapore's international partners and to the maritime shipping community. The mission of the Operations Group was to deliver swift and effective maritime security responses.

26. MSTF was planned to achieve Full Operating Capability in the later half of next year during Exercise APEX 2010. APEX was an annual national-level multi-agency exercise to provide an avenue for the SAF and related agencies to train together. During the Exercise

APEX 2010, international partners would be fully immersed in the Information Fusion Centre and the Multi-national Operations and Exercises Centre.

27. The IFC was therefore designed to focus on three key tasks; collating and fusing information shared by the community of maritime security partners and delivering actionable information. First, the centre had been configured to plug deep into an invaluable network of linkages, ranging from national agencies to international partners, and the shipping community. Secondly, the centre would employ several cutting-edge information technology platforms and systems.

28. OASIS enabled automatic and comprehensive collation and fusion of information while SMART was a “customisable” rule-based analytical tool that tapped on OASIS to conduct threat evaluation. At the international and multi-lateral level, the Regional Maritime Information Exchange System was introduced to facilitate inter-OPSCEN collaboration among the WPNS community. The Malacca Straits Patrol Info-System was introduced to facilitate inter-OPSCEN collaboration among Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Firstly, MOEC was a ready platform for international partners, military and non-military, to come together to inter-operate quickly. MOEC could be used for maritime security operations and be easily configured to support other types of operations such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Secondly, the MOEC was scalable to support up to 2 simultaneous operations. Thirdly, it was compatible with a diverse range of command and control systems. The centre which will be ready in September 2009, would be used to host Exercise BERSAMA LIMA in October 2009.

#### Briefing by Vietnam on Maritime Security Challenges in the South China Sea and Defence Cooperation on Maritime Security

29. Sr Col Le Kim Dzung, Director of International Division, The Institute of Military Strategy of MOD of Vietnam gave a briefing on Maritime Security Challenges in the South China Sea and Defence Cooperation on Maritime Security. Sr Col Dzung said that the Maritime Security situation in the South China Sea was a complex issue. The challenges ranged from traditional security issues to non-traditional security issues. The main traditional security issues in East Asia were tension in the Korean Peninsula, the sensitive situation in the Taiwan Straits, and territorial disputes. Any confrontation in the Korean Peninsula could raise tension in Northeast Asia especially after North Korea had conducted its nuclear and missile tests. Potential military conflict existed in the Taiwan Straits. If “flash-points” evolved into wars, maritime security situation in the South China Sea would be seriously affected. Prolonged and complicated territorial disputes in the South China Sea were emerging as a major threat to regional maritime security. Most countries which shared maritime boundaries had been involved in disputes because of differences in claims on sovereignty of territory and exclusive economic zones.

30. Piracy, terrorism and other forms of maritime crimes, climate change and disasters at sea were most common non-traditional security challenges to maritime security in the region. Littoral countries and other nations shared common concerns because any terrorist attack on the important sea-lanes of the region would cause great loss not only to the countries which directly suffered the attack but it would affect other countries in the region as well. International terrorist groups had active members and supporters in the region. The South China Sea had suffered from many marine calamities.

31. Defence dialogue between related countries was a good way to help countries understand each other. It created opportunities to resolve the problems or at least, prevent the situation from getting worse. Ministries of Defence in the region should give high priority to regional cooperation to deal with bilateral maritime security issues such as joint patrol and control over overlapping territorial claim areas in order to prevent cross border crimes such as trafficking, illegal emigration, children, woman and drug smuggling. The hotlines of communication between Vietnam People's Navy and Royal Thai Navy, Royal Cambodian Navy and Navy of PLA were very effective in ensuring maritime security.

32. Cooperation between countries in the region and all other related countries outside the region would be necessary to deal with maritime security threats. It was necessary to expand and promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as exchange of information, experiences building and coordinated mechanisms among concerned agencies of the governments, to prevent, cope with and deal with non-traditional security threats.

33. Defence cooperation to ensure security in the South China Sea should be a part of the process of ASEAN's cooperation towards building the ASEAN political and security community in 2015 because maritime security challenges could severely affect all the countries in the region. However, maritime security issues were very complicated and were sensitive not only because they have close links to their national interests but also to their national dignity. Cooperation between the institutes for defence studies in researching this issue would play an essential role to help enhance maritime security in the region.

#### Briefing by Indonesia on Maritime Security Challenges, Defence Cooperation and Enhancing ASEAN Militaries' Role

34. Col Dr. Antonius Yani Antariksa, Secretary of the Pusjianstra TNI, Indonesian Armed Forces Strategic Studies Center, briefed on the maritime security challenges from the Indonesian perspective. Maritime security challenges became a subject of debate among many different quarters, especially the recent incident off the coast of Somalia. NTS issues occurring on a global scale had become major issues at the regional level. On the domestic front, Indonesia as a nation located in the middle of the globe, could not escape from global and regional developments including political, economic, social and security dynamics. Domestic security issues could not be separated from the contribution of external factors, directly or indirectly internal factors were also potential threats to national security. The accumulation of external and internal factors manifested itself in varying forms of threats and disturbances to national security which on a larger scale could pose threats to regional stability.

35. Being transnational in nature and ignoring political boundaries, the agenda had moved from the traditional concerns such as piracy and armed robbery to non-traditional concerns such as terrorist activities drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling of goods and people, illegal fishing and environmental degradation. Maritime security threatened the economic growth and welfare of ASEAN member countries and their people. Maritime security challenges faced by Indonesia included trans-national threats, including maritime terrorism, sea piracy/sea robbery, illegal migration, refugees/human trafficking, assistance during natural disasters, smuggling, illegal fishing, pollution, destruction of the ecosystem had

spawned a multitude of additional “out of area” operational roles for regional navies, and had dramatically increased the maritime security challenges of the South Asian Region.

36. Dr. Yani stated that the possible areas of cooperation amongst ASEAN militaries in maritime security. International cooperation in the defence field was an integral part of Indonesia’s “overseas policy” as it was one of the bridges to build mutual trust with other nations. Indonesia’s active role in peacekeeping operations was in line with the Preamble of UUD 1945, to achieve a peaceful world based on sovereignty, eternal peace and social justice. Indonesia was still actively participating in UN peace keeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNMIL) and Georgia (UNOMIG), thus demonstrating Indonesia’s strong commitment to universal peace, enhanced its foreign relations and its independent and active foreign policy, thus increasing Indonesia’s image within the international community fora. Bilateral cooperation in defence and maritime security cooperation was directed towards building a feeling of mutual trust and resolving defence cases. Possible area of cooperation among ASEAN militaries to manage threats were enhanced information exchange, interagency cooperative frameworks through bilateral/regional arrangement, implementation of international laws and standard of security measures such as ISPS code. Operational solutions included Coordinated Patrol among Navies, hot pursuit arrangement, developing standard operational procedures and interoperability, exchanges in port security measures, the use of advanced technology, establishment of Maritime Electronic Highway (IMO and World Bank sponsored), establishment of Auto Track Information System (AIS) for ship DWT 300 GT, establishment of focal points, tactical training and exercises.

37. Dr Yani said that the role of ASEAN militaries in enhancing maritime security cooperation, and security at sea was complex and no single country could handle maritime security alone. They shared the view that cooperation should be done based on international laws and conventions between and among countries in order to manage security effectively. Besides piracy, human smuggling, illegal immigrants passing through the Asia Pacific waters had also increased. Human smuggling was very complicated because several countries were involved and each had different interests especially in security, humanity, economy and politics. Large scale illegal migration was often carried out by illegal organizations with international networks. The role of military internally was to prevent maritime terrorism, sea piracy/ sea robbery, illegal fishing, pollution and destruction of the ecosystem action and guaranteed peace. Externally it was to increase security stability in the region. The navy’s role in safeguarding national defence and security also provided diplomatic support for the country’s foreign policy objectives.

#### Briefing by Cambodia on Maritime Security Challenges

38. Bri.Gen. Lay Chanda, Deputy Director of Policy and Planning Department, General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defence gave a briefing on the general maritime security situation from Cambodia’s perspective. Cambodia shared common borders with the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Gulf of Thailand. Under Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodia’s economic growth rate had been increasing. As such, maintaining maritime good order and maritime security was important. Despite the relatively small maritime area of Cambodia, its potential in terms of tourism, marine resource, gas, natural mineral resources were great. Current discovery of under sea bed petroleum and gas was considered a remarkable, historical change of the national development acceleration on many sectors.

39. The important tasks concerning maintaining of safety and maritime security were: Firstly, defending the nation's territorial integrity, sovereignty, air space, islands, strait, natural resource, exclusive economic zone and engaging in social development. Secondly, maintaining good order, preventing and suppressing all illegal activities such as piracy, armed robbery, drug smuggling, illicit small armed smuggling, illegal foreign fishing, immigration, environmental pollution, transnational crimes and terrorism. Thirdly, maintaining the perpetuity of fishery, marine life bio-diversity in the sea and in the coastal zone, prevention and suppression of illegal fishing. Fourthly, safeguarding the harbour, ship navigation, transportation water way, improving navigation aids, disseminating meteorological information, and telecommunication. Fifthly, readiness for quick respond to disaster operation like safeguarding the natural environment, engaging bilaterally or multilaterally in oil spill cleaning up operations. Finally, the role for search and rescue activities.

40. Bri.Gen. Lay Chanda said that there were positive and negative aspects to the challenges concerning national and international maritime issues. The negative impacts resulted from human resources shortage, lack of equipment, training, responsibility, coordination of some cases funding, among competent maritime authorities particularly governance.

41. The Royal Cambodian Navy had the capabilities to deal with challenges within its national jurisdiction limit. It was essentially dependent on the ability to establishing a mechanism or a national authority to cope with all the illegal activities that threatened maritime security. Furthermore, it required a transparent applicable approach for integration of manifold competent institutions and legal framework that clearly outlined role and mission which could help the authority to fulfil their tasks efficiently. Maintaining maritime safety and security was a key concern and it would demand support from the initiative country and international community.

42. The Royal Cambodian Navy was in readiness status in order to fully cooperate with all national competent authorities and institutions to carry out the mission, to maintain maritime safety, security of the nation, in the region and in the whole world.

#### Briefing by Thailand on Maritime Security Challenges and the Role of the Royal Thai Armed Forces

43. Col Tanongsak Rongtim, Director of Division of Plan and Project, Strategic Studies Center, said that Thailand was located geographically almost in the middle of ASEAN and its neighbours were Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar. In view of Thailand's geographic location, Thailand realised that its maritime security in this region would not concern only Thailand but also the other neighbouring countries.

44. Col Tanongsak pointed out that Thailand had few problems on claims of sovereignty of territory with its neighbouring countries. In other words, Thailand's navy had good relations and cooperation with the navies of the neighbouring countries. However, there were a few threats facing Thailand for example terrorism, combating piracy, illegal immigrants, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime pollution and problems arising from disasters such as tsunami. To cope with these challenges, the ASEAN countries should cooperate closely and share information.

45. The Royal Thai Armed Forces especially the Navy had played a key role in maritime security. In terms of domestic organisational cooperation, Thailand had the Border Security Mechanism and Neighbour Cooperation Structure through which Thailand could discuss with neighbouring countries to solve any problem. In terms of regional cooperation, Thailand had joint border patrols with Vietnam, India and Malaysia. In terms of international cooperation, Thailand was part of ReCAAP and the joint patrols among the littoral states in the Malacca Straits Patrols.

46. To deal with the foregoing challenges and issues, Thailand had established the Thai Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center Roles on Maritime Security Cooperation (THAI-MECC) which operated under the National Security Council. Thailand has the readiness and capability to cooperate with other ASEAN countries to deal with any kind of maritime security challenges.

### **Session Two: Exchange of Views on Possible Areas of Cooperation among ASEAN Militaries in Maritime Security**

47. The NADI representatives had an extensive exchange of views on the possible areas of cooperation among the ASEAN militaries. They felt that the close cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in coordinated naval patrols in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well the eyes-in-the-sky patrol among Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, had contributed to the significant decline in the number of piracy cases in the region. The role of the ReCAAP ISC in information sharing and the cooperation of the maritime community in ensuring preventive procedures on ships, had also contributed to the declining trend in piracy.

48. So far, the environment in the region has been peaceful and there was safety of navigation through the South China Sea and the region. However the new emerging security trend like the increasing naval presence of regional and external navies and the re-assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea and a few incidents of near confrontation in recent times, had raised concerns. If these developments were not managed well, they could give rise to conflicts and cause problems to the safety of navigation through the South China Sea and the region. It was therefore important to foster closer ASEAN military cooperation among the NADI members and to build confidence among them.

49. The NADI representatives suggested that the ASEAN militaries especially the Chiefs of Navy, could meet annually to build confidence and promote better understanding of each other's thinking on maritime security and work towards resolving any differences in a peaceful way for peace and security in the region.

50. The NADI representatives also noted the briefing by RSIS on Good Order at Sea. They felt that the recommendations which included enhanced regional cooperation through institutionalizing the process of regional cooperation for good order at sea would require institutional arrangements and capacity building. The ASEAN Maritime Forum process should be re-invigorated and the ARF-ISM on Maritime Security could be supported as frameworks for developing regional institutionalized approach for good order at Sea. Another area suggested was the improvement in risks assessment and reduction and more effective and cooperative approach for analysis of threats and contingency planning for major maritime security incidents that might occur in the region. More effective bilateral and tri-lateral

agreements could be developed to manage incidents in areas where conflicting claims to sovereignty or maritime boundaries, had not been agreed.

51. Another area of cooperation would be the wider information sharing. A high level of good order at sea in the Southeast Asia region would require regional countries to take steps to enhance the sharing of information between them that would be relevant to the detection, prevention and suppression of threats to ensure good order at sea. It would be useful to adopt and implement international “best practices” that had been developed in this regard.

### **Session Three: Role of the ASEAN Militaries in Enhancing Maritime Security**

52. The ASEAN militaries could play a significant role in enhancing maritime security through participation in joint exercises which could promote better understanding and cooperation. The NADI representatives noted the briefing by LTC Chow on the MSTF’s role in enhancing maritime security. In this regard, an area of cooperation would be for NADI members’ militaries especially their navies, to participate in the exercises conducted by the Changi C2 and the IFC to better coordinate their operations and enhancing information sharing to deal with maritime threats. The MOEC would be a useful platform for the maritime security operations and also as a platform to provide support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

53. The NADI representatives discussed the issue of a possible major oil tankers collision in the Straits of Malacca which could have far reaching implications and consequences like pollution by debris and oil spills and the accident impeding sea lanes through the Straits. It would be useful and relevant for the ASEAN militaries particularly their navies, to consider what role they could play in managing such a disaster. Therefore it is suggested that consideration could be given to study the role of the ASEAN militaries in such a situation.

#### Briefing on ReCAAP’s Role in Information Sharing and Cooperation among Regional Countries in Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia

54. Ms Lee Yin Mui, Assistant Director (Research) ReCAAP ISC, using video clips and power points, briefed the meeting on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) which was the first government-to-government agreement that addressed the incidence of piracy and armed robbery in Asia. The three pillars of the ReCAAP were information sharing, capacity building and cooperative arrangements. The Agreement was finalised on 11 November 2004 in Tokyo, and came into force on 4 September 2006 with the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) located in Singapore. The key operating principles of the ReCAAP ISC were respect for countries’ sovereignty, effectiveness and transparency.

55. The roles of the ReCAAP ISC included exchanging information among Contracting Parties on incidents of piracy and armed robbery, facilitating operational cooperation among Contracting Parties, analysing the patterns and trends of piracy and armed robbery and supporting capacity building efforts of Contracting Parties and sharing of best practices through co-operative arrangements.

56. Each ReCAAP Contracting Party has designated a Focal Point as a point of contact with the ReCAAP ISC in managing piracy and armed robbery incidents within its territorial waters and areas of jurisdiction. The Focal Points would act as point of information exchange

with the ReCAAP ISC, to facilitate its country's law enforcement investigations, and to coordinate enforcement for piracy and armed robbery with neighbouring Focal Points. The ReCAAP ISC had facilitated exchange of information among the ReCAAP Focal Points through a secure web-based Information Network system (IFN).

57. For the purpose of analysis, the ReCAAP ISC adopted a matrix-based classification system in evaluating each incident based on the violence associated with the incident and the type of economic loss incurred. The classification system categorised each incident according to its level of significance. This provided a qualitative dimension in differentiating the nature of each incident and enabled the law enforcement agencies and authorities to deploy their resources optimally in areas under their jurisdiction.

58. Ms Lee also gave an update on the general trends from 2004 to 2008, as well as the first half of 2009 (January 2009 to June 2009).

### **Any Other Matters**

#### Visit to Changi Command and Control Centre (C2 Centre) and Information Fusion Centre (IFC)

59. Mr Tan Seng Chye briefed the NADI participants on the Changi Command and Control Centre, built next to Changi Naval Base, which housed the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), an Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and a Multi-national Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC). The Changi C2 Centre would advance multi-agency cooperation and inter-operability among national maritime agencies, to enhance Singapore's maritime security capabilities. The Centre would also enable international cooperation and inter-operability between countries to promote maritime security in the region.

60. The SMSC would bring together elements from key domestic maritime agencies such as the Republic of Singapore Navy, Maritime and Port Authority and the Police Coast Guard under one roof. The IFC was intended to facilitate proactive sharing and fusion of information to enable analysis, planning and co-ordination of maritime responses in a more collaborative and networked manner. The IFC housed the necessary computer networks to fuse, analyse and disseminate information shared by participating militaries and agencies.

61. The MOEC would be able to support the planning and conduct of bilateral and multi-lateral exercises and operations. It could enhance the conduct of multi-lateral exercises, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) exercises and function as a Maritime Security Centre for the conduct of maritime security operations or as a regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Centre should such a need arise. The Changi C2 Centre would provide the useful platform for nations to cooperate and respond more flexibly and effectively to a dynamic maritime security environment.

62. Subsequently the NADI representatives found the visit to the IFC and the briefings on the Changi C2 Centre and the IFC useful and informative.

### Enhancing NADI's support for ADMM's Track

63. The NADI representatives exchanged views on how to enhance NADI's relevance and support for the ADMM track. They felt that NADI should play a more pro-active role in supporting the ADMM track. In this regard, NADI could hold more meetings/workshops/seminars to discuss new ideas and recommendations to promote ASEAN militaries' cooperation to deal with the challenges from traditional and non-traditional security issues so as to ensure regional peace and security. NADI could prepare a list of seminars and workshops on issues of interest to the ADMM Track when they next meet in Vietnam.

### Workshop on Peacekeeping Operations

64. Malaysia has offered to host a Workshop on Peace Keeping Operations in the first half of 2010, the date to be determined later.

### **Concluding Remarks**

65. The NADI representatives look forward to the third NADI meeting scheduled to be held in Vietnam in 2010.

66. The representatives of the ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions expressed their sincere appreciation to the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies for the warm hospitality accorded to them and the excellent arrangements made for the NADI Workshop on Maritime Security.

29 July 2009  
Singapore